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Abstract 
 
This paper defines the preponderance of the evidence standard and establishes it as a benchmark, 
optimal under certain idealized conditions. The main conditions are: only efficiency matters (not 
fairness); people are risk-neutral; sanctions are socially costless; and a suit may be brought even if no 
violation of the law has occurred. 
Concerning the definition of preponderance of the evidence, a distinction is made between standards 
based on probability of guilt and standards based on the evidence. It is stressed that the latter does not 
include ex-ante information concerning the offender's type, and should hence not be associated with a 
probability of guilt in a Bayesian sense. 
 1
Introduction 
 
Different standards of proof are employed in different kinds of legal disputes. Beyond a reasonable 
doubt is the standard mainly used in criminal law, proof by clear and convincing evidence is the standard 
required e.g. for civil commitment of the mentally ill1, while preponderance of the evidence is generally 
held to be the standard employed in civil cases, e.g. involving breach of contract. In the law and 
economics literature one finds relatively little (systematic) work that discusses how these standards 
should be defined and understood, or that determines when each should be applied2 
3
. 
This paper investigates the preponderance of the evidence standard. The aim is to make clear what 
preponderance of the evidence means and when it is optimal. By defining the circumstances under which 
it is optimal, it will also become clear when the standard is not appropriate, namely when the 
circumstances do not apply. 
It is important to define the setting to which the present analysis applies. We shall assume that a 
potential offender may choose either to obey or to break the law4; either action fixes a probability 
distribution over a set of signals that a court will observe, as in the standard moral hazard model. The 
court will, if a suit is brought before it, compare the weight of the information it receives with its 
standard of proof (or “proof burden”). Suit may be brought either by a law enforcement agent (such as a 
police officer who monitors car-driving) or by an aggrieved party (such as a party to a contract who may 
have observed a signal indicating breach). We will assume that everyone will observe the same signal5; 
this assumption implies that the outcome of a trial will be predictable (if the signal meets the proof 
burden there will be conviction); hence there will be no trial, -only settlement-, and we can ignore 
litigation costs6. To simplify further, we will assume that the effort spent by the enforcement agent or the 
aggrieved party in gathering information (in retrieving the signal) is exogenous7. In the setting just 
described, I will show that preponderance of the evidence is optimal under the following further 
                                                          
1 or e.g. for proof of actual malice in public figure libel cases. 
2 Much of the work related to the standard of proof discusses the consequences for optimal enforcement of imperfect 
information concerning "guilt". For articles that discuss the optimal standard of proof per se, see e.g. Davis [2], 
Miceli [7], Pug [8], Posner [9], Schauer and Zeckhauser [10] and Schrag and Scotchmer [11]. 
3 1n particular, I have not found work that places the analysis of the optimal standard of proof within the theoretical 
framework developed by e.g. Kaplow [3], Shavell [13], and Polinsky [14], following Becker's seminal article [1]. 
4 In a broad sense, including e.g. performing a contract, taking due care, or adhering to a rule such as a speeding 
limit. 
5 in reality, of course, an enforcement agent or an aggrieved party may not be able to correctly predict what 
information the court will eventually possess. 
6 See Shavell and Polinsky [14] for an analysis of how legal error may affect incentives to obey the law and 
incentives to litigate. They assume that the court may receive a different signal than that of the parties, so litigation 
may occur.  
7 In reality it may be determined in part by the proof burden; however, this complication will be ignored in our 
context.   
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assumptions: only efficiency matters (fairness does not matter); people are risk-neutral; sanctions are 
socially costless to impose; and a signal of a wrong committed may be emitted even if no violation of the 
law has occurred8. This part of the paper can be summarized in the statement that preponderance of the 
evidence maximizes deterrence. 
At the conceptual level, I will argue that preponderance of the evidence should be distinguished 
from a standard that finds the defendant guilty when the probability of guilt is higher than 50%. Some 
authors fail to make this distinction. For example, Schauer and Zeckhauser [10] write (p.33): 
 
“We take the preponderance of the evidence standard as equivalent to a .5, proof, beyond a reasonable 
doubt as roughly .95, and proof by clear and convincing evidence even more roughly as perhaps .75”. 
 
However, a standard of evidence does not refer to the probability of guilt but only to the weight of the 
evidence. The former includes ex-ante information concerning the offender's type, as will be further 
discussed below.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: The preponderance of the evidence standard is first defined. 
Second, the argument is made why this standard under certain conditions maximizes deterrence. Third, 
this argument leads naturally to a discussion of the conceptual distinction between standards of evidence 
and standards of guilt. Fourth, we return to the assumptions under which preponderance of the evidence 
is optimal. Comments and a summary end the paper.  
 
Definition 
 
The preponderance of the evidence standard can be defined as the standard that sanctions whenever the 
evidence of the case (i.e. the set of received signals) is relatively more likely to be received when a 
violation has occurred than when it has not9. A bit of notation is useful here. Let the evidence in a given 
case be x . Let  be the probability, at the time of the action, that this evidence will be realized if the 
illegal
p
10 act is committed, and let q  be the probability that x  will be produced if the illegal act is not 
committed. Then preponderance of the evidence will be defined to mean that a sanction will be applied if 
and only if p  is greater than .  q
This raises the question what evidence means. I shall interpret evidence as signals concerning 
actions, excluding e.g. information concerning race, social class, or other kinds of information 
                                                          
8 The arguments in this paper will be verbal not mathematical; for mathematical proofs see my working paper [5]. 
9 In technical terms this means that the sanction should be applied when the likelihood ratio exceeds one. 
10 For convenience, the term illegal is used even though we may be dealing with e.g. a breach of contract. 
9 
concerning the type of actor involved. As an example, information showing that the defendant is a 
repeat-offender is not part of the evidence according to this definition; it is ex-ante information 
concerning type. Witness-testimony on the other hand is evidence. 
The distinction is whether a given piece of information is in itself informative of those actions that are in 
dispute. 
 
Why preponderance of the evidence maximizes deterrence 
 
It will now be argued that preponderance of the evidence, as just defined, maximizes deterrence11. 
Using the notation above, this follows from the fact that if p > q for the evidence x  in a given case, 
then sp ∗  > sq ∗ , where s is the (positive) sanction. This means that preponderance of the evidence 
ensures that the expected sanction will be higher when the illegal act has been performed than when it 
has not. When this is the case, the existence of a sanction will act as an inducement not to break the law. 
Conversely, if p < q for some other evidence , then no sanction should be applied, since the no-
sanction outcome then occurs with higher probability when the legal rather than the illegal act has been 
undertaken.  The point is that the court should respond to any given signal in such a way that when the 
potential offender contemplates the response of the court to the signal, the offender is swayed in the 
direction of obeying the law. 
y
Thus, preponderance of the evidence maximizes deterrence, but it is not always the case that 
maximal deterrence is optimal, as we shall discuss below. However, before turning to this point it is 
worth elaborating on what preponderance of the evidence means in terms of the kind of information that 
a court should use (and, equally important, should not use) in reaching a verdict. 
 
On the non-use of ex-ante information 
 
One easily takes for granted that a judge should establish the probability of guilt. The implicit notion 
behind this view is (in a Bayesian world) that the judge should up-date prior beliefs concerning “guilt” 
with the weight of the evidence in order to arrive at the (ex-post) probability of guilt. To express this 
mathematically, when A expresses the ex-ante beliefs (the a priori likelihood that a person of a given 
"type" would commit the act in question) and L is the likelihood ratio (the weight of the evidence), the 
task of the judge is seen as establishing final beliefs about guilt, P, where Bayes' law establishes that 
LAP ∗= . However, as just argued, only L is relevant when the aim is deterrence: when only deterrence 
                                                          
11 This result is shown formally in my working paper [5]. 
9 
matters ex-ante probabilities of guilt or innocence should play no role in deciding whether to impose a 
sanction.  
This distinction between the probability of guilt and the likelihood ratio is worth highlighting, since it is 
easy to confound the two. The likelihood ratio seems to be concerned with the probability that the 
defendant did commit the act or did not, but this impression can be deceptive. To see this, consider the 
simple textbook moral hazard model. The principal will know which action the agent takes (e.g. either 
high or low effort), but will still optimally commit to sanctioning the agent if the likelihood ratio 
indicates low effort. In this deterministic model, there is no uncertainty concerning actions, so from this 
it can be seen that the likelihood ratio does not express the likelihood that low or high effort was 
undertaken. 
To see that this distinction has real world implications, e.g. for the law of evidence12, consider the 
following example. Let there be a society in which subcultures A and B differ in their propensity for 
crime. Imagine that very few people in A even consider committing theft while almost everyone in B 
commits theft if it is to their (amoral) personal advantage. Imagine further that a person from either 
subculture is apprehended by the police, and that the evidence (as defined above) raised against them 
turns out to be identical. If the aim of sanctioning is deterrence, should a court then treat the two cases in 
the same way even though the probability of guilt is different in the two cases? According to the result 
above, the answer is yes. The verdict should in both cases be "guilty" when the evidence before the 
judge is more likely to be the outcome of a theft than not. It may seem surprising that the optimal system 
in this way totally disregards ex ante probabilities, but note that if we assume that the payment of a fine 
is a mere transfer of value, and in this sense costless to society, then it may be worthwhile to impose a 
fine even when it is unlikely in a Bayesian sense that a person is guilty. The point is that applying the 
preponderance of the evidence standard constitutes a costless way for society of maximizing deterrence 
of the few potential offenders in subculture A. 
We now turn to the question when maximal deterrence is optimal, or, put differently, when 
preponderance of the evidence is an optimal standard. 
 
When is preponderance of the evidence optimal? 
No risk-aversion 
 
When social welfare includes only efficiency and not fairness, whether or not potential offenders are 
risk-averse does not affect the result that preponderance of the evidence maximizes deterrence. This can 
                                                          
12 For example for the issue whether or not to allow character-evidence in court. This question is analyzed by Schrag 
and Scotchmer [11], but note that their set-up is different from that presented here. As argued in the section below 
concerning whether or not investigations may take place when there is no offense. 
9 
be seen clearly in the case where there are only two outcomes (either a person must pay a sanction or 
not); in this case risk-aversion or concavity of the utility function implies only that the difference 
between the utility in these two states is increased (loosely speaking). It is then intuitive that the 
rationale of the preponderance of the evidence standard, as put forward above, remains true. More 
generally, also for a risk-averse agent a sanction deters an action if and only if the sanction is applied 
with greater probability if the action has been performed. 
However, when people are risk-averse, the imposition of a fine becomes socially costly in terms of 
risk-bearing, and for this reason it will generally be optimal for society to sanction in fewer states. Some 
deterrence will hereby be lost but this effect will be small when the probability of the state is nearly the 
same whether or not an illegal act has been committed. In comparison, the effect on risk-bearing of no 
longer sanctioning in such a state will not in the same way be negligible; it will be a first-order effect. 
The tradeoff between deterrence and risk-bearing which emerges when potential offenders are risk-
averse is well-known from the moral hazard literature, and will hence not be mentioned further here. 
 
Zero social cost of imposing penalties 
 
As when people are risk-averse, when it is costly to impose sanctions, this will tend to make the optimal 
standard stricter; the benefit of sanctioning in some state of nature must be balanced by the cost of so 
doing. For those states of nature that occur with only a slightly increased probability if the unlawful act 
is committed, the cost of sanctioning renders it useless to sanction, even though sanctioning would 
increase deterrence (slightly). The cost of sanctioning should here be interpreted in a wide sense, 
including e.g. the costs of litigation13. 
 
Investigations may occur even if there is no unlawful action 
 
Even if people could be assumed to be risk-neutral and sanctions could be assumed to be simply 
transfers of wealth, there would remain an important set of circumstances for which it is misleading to 
think of preponderance of the evidence standard as an optimal standard of proof. This class of cases has 
not, in my view, been sufficiently noted in the existing literature. 
Consider as an example the choice facing a potential murderer: If he or she decides not to commit 
murder, there will be no victim, hence no investigations and hence no possibility of an unfair conviction. 
Hence, the possibility of an unfair verdict should not affect his or her incentives. Naturally, he or she 
may fear being unfairly convicted for a crime committed by someone else, but this possibility remains if 
                                                          
13 For the case where litigation is costly, see Shavell and Polinsky [14]. 
9 
he or she commits the first-mentioned crime. If being sanctioned for two offences is twice as bad as 
being sanctioned for one (which will of course not necessarily be the case; for instance, one of the 
sanctions may be the death penalty or stigma may enter), then the probability of an unfair conviction 
should not affect the incentives of the potential murderer. In other words, the incentives of the potential 
murderer are only affected by the possibility of an unfair conviction if he or she thinks that 
investigations may take place even if he or she does not commit the murder, and that is highly 
implausible. Thus, it is only for such offenses where investigations may take place independent of the 
wrongful act, that our rationale for the preponderance of the evidence standard applies14. Such offences 
include e.g. speeding in traffic; causing an accident through careless driving (where the accident may 
occur even if one drives with care; this was Png's example); committing some other tort; or breaching a 
contract. 
 
Discussion 
 
It may be asked whether the preponderance of the evidence standard remains optimal when the 
possibility is opened up that the sanction could depend on the weight of the evidence. It was implicit in 
the arguments above that a sanction is either applied or not. 
It turns out that the answer is affirmative. In the above example when p > q, the sanction should be 
maximal15 to maximize deterrence16, and when p < q the sanction should be minimal, i.e. zero, to 
maximize the incentive to perform. When only deterrence matters, there is no reason to graduate 
sanctions. 
This raises another question: May preponderance of the evidence not lead to over-deterrence if the 
sanction is set at a very high level as it should be according to Becker's [1] analysis of the case of risk-
neutrality? From a utilitarian viewpoint, the expected sanction should be no higher than the externality 
created by the unlawful act, and one can imagine that if the sanction and the probability of apprehension 
are very high, it may be optimal to lower deterrence by adopting a different standard of proof than 
preponderance of the evidence. However, given the assumptions of risk-neutrality and costless litigation 
and sanctioning, it will be preferable to save resources on enforcement (e.g. on monitoring traffic) to 
bring down deterrence to its optimal level, rather than to change the standard of proof. Given our main 
                                                          
14 Schrag and Scotchmer [11] find that the possibility of an unfair conviction may affect the incentives of a person 
considering whether or not to commit murder but their analysis rests on the assumption that the murderer will think 
that if he/she does not kill a given person (in a dark alley) somebody else might kill that same person, and the blame 
may then still be on him/her. While this situation may occur it seems, as the authors admit in an accompanying 
paper [12], somewhat contrived. 
15 We have implicitly assumed that the sanction is set at some maximal level perhaps determined by the wealth of 
individuals, and that over-deterrence is not an issue. 
16 in line with Becker's [1] result that maximal sanctions are optimal when agents are risk-neutral, see Kaplow-
9 
assumptions, adopting the preponderance of the evidence standard maximizes deterrence with no social 
cost while it is clear that law enforcement in the form of monitoring of behavior is not without cost17. 
 
Summary 
 
This article has put forward a simple incentive argument in favor of preponderance of the evidence: it 
maximizes deterrence since it maximizes the difference in expected utility between adhering to and 
violating the law. This establishes preponderance of the evidence standard as a benchmark in civil law. 
However, maximal deterrence is not the only aim of the legal system. When fairness is an important 
concern, when agents are risk-averse, and when litigation and the imposition of a sanction are socially 
costly, preponderance of the evidence will no longer be optimal. The standard will then have to be 
modified to take these factors into account. 
Furthermore, it was stressed that the incentive argument makes little sense when investigations do 
not occur at all when there has been no violation of the law. This is often the case for criminal acts such 
as e.g. murder. 
At the conceptual level, it was stressed that preponderance of the evidence should be distinguished 
from standards referring to probability of guilt (which is the case for the criminal law standard of 
"beyond a reasonable doubt", see e.g. Miceli   [7]. Preponderance of the evidence relies only on the 
evidence and not on ex-ante information concerning type. Since it ignores ex-ante probabilities of guilt, 
it may have only little to do with the probability of guilt in a Bayesian sense. 
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